Author: Toka Mahmoud
Yemen’s water crisis is dire. Nearly 18 million people lack safe water. In rural areas, families may rely on trucked water from 30 kilometers away, often at extremely high prices. Some reviews indicate that climate change, combined with unsustainable groundwater use, can contribute to migration. However, the relationship between water insecurity and migration in Yemen has complex roots that go well beyond the escalation of war in 2014.
Research and reports show that water insecurity drives migration—but the story depends on many factors, especially with slow-onset water issues. Migration related to water insecurity is shaped by more than just sudden droughts. It is intertwined with many local and national contexts.
This article examines the connection between migration and water insecurity in Yemen. It also highlights how governance and social equity influence this relationship. The arguments use literature and population data drawn from the World Bank’s DataBank. Governance here refers to the political and social systems managing water and agriculture, while social equity means fair access to those resources.
Key Pathways to Water Insecurity
Water stress in Yemen has reached over 80%, with annual per-person supplies below 120 cubic meters. For comparison, the international threshold for absolute scarcity is just 500 cubic meters. Groundwater is being depleted quickly, sometimes by 1–8 meters per year.
Water insecurity acts through indirect pathways. It can hinder agriculture, infrastructure, or manufacturing, depending on how adaptable society is. Migration is shaped by personal needs, aspirations, and capabilities. While water insecurity affects national production, it only leads to migration if it threatens livelihoods or well-being. Factors like food, water, income, network, and education help explain both migration and immobility.
Water insecurity impacts Yemen at ecosystem, society, and well-being levels. The main drivers in Yemen are slow-onset water problems caused by unsustainable groundwater use and climate change. These result in both lower water quantity and quality.
On the ecosystem level, 90% of arable land is at risk of desertification. Twenty percent is lost each year to sandstorms. Studies in Tohama Valley and Al-Jar village report high salinity, while many springs have dried up, like the Hababdh spring in Sana’a.
On the society level, groundwater pumping increased agricultural production until political instability and war caused a decline. This trend led to more water-intensive cash crops, making the sector vulnerable. A 2009 drought, for example, led to a 24% drop in cereal production.
For human well-being, water scarcity and desertification have raised poverty. In some basins, farmers now drill over 800 meters for water, making cash crops the only viable option due to high costs (cash crop justification).
Water Insecurity and Migration
Most Yemenis rely on farming, but migration due to water insecurity often stems more from governance failures than from drought. Sudden shifts in population growth didn’t match with droughts, but rather with changes in policy and the economy.
Yemen’s agricultural governance and social-economic systems are tightly linked. Policy changes, tribal laws, and economics—not just direct government action—shape the sector. Before the 1980s, communal ownership and tribal management dominated. In the mid-1970s, tribal leaders renegotiated rights, allowing upstream and private well-drilling. This move sped up agricultural development and shifted land to private hands, which makes the current crisis easier to understand.
This transition triggered both migration and a race for deeper aquifers. As water declined, smaller landowners sold land to finance wells. Wealthier individuals became dominant landholders, increasing social inequity.
The World Bank introduced major programs in 1985, but these targeted areas dependent on small-scale farming. Local farmers lost access, accelerating inequality and population decreases, especially in rural areas.
The 1990s saw more changes. After the Gulf Crisis, many Yemenis returned home, increasing unemployment. The government tried to help with subsidies and bans on crop imports, making water-intensive crops more profitable. However, this raised the number of wells and made groundwater decline worse. Once subsidies ended, fuel prices jumped and well-drilling costs soared, contributing to lower population growth as migration became harder.
There were no major upswings in migration after the war began, but migration remained closely tied to persistent water insecurity and socio-political change (more severe crisis).
Advancing the Water Sector
Yemen’s water challenges predate the current war. Scarcity was never the only factor. As shown, complex governance and economic dynamics deepened water insecurity and shaped migration.
Migration always involves many factors. Nonetheless, the links between governance, socio-political shifts, and changes in population cannot be ignored. These have strongly influenced Yemen’s water-related migration and show why sustainable planning and local solutions are so important.
For centuries, Yemen was called “Fertile Arabia.” The country balanced water scarcity with self-sufficiency in crops like coffee. Future efforts to rebuild Yemen’s water sector should focus on long-term planning, fair resource management, and the integration of modern practices. Examples include solar-powered irrigation, rainwater harvesting in terraced mountains, large-scale systems like the Marib Dam, and traditional cisterns.
This is a condensed version of the original article. Access the full article here: “Aquifer’s Descent: Shaping key pathways from water insecurity to migration in Yemen”